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Contesting Urban Agriculture 
The  Po l i t i cs  o f  Mea t  P roduc t ion  in  the  
L i cense -Buy -Back  Scheme (2006–2007)  
i n  Hong  Kong  
Kin Wing Chan 
Rarely do people associate pig farming with the cityscape of Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong, however, has a long history of agricultural development since the 
British ruled the area after the First Opium War in 1842. Controlling the food 
supply was a crucial political maneuver for the British government to 
safeguard the colony’s stability and security. During the British rule, farming 
subsidies, technological extension services, and animal donations became the 
governing tactics to boost the production of vegetables, fisheries, and pigs 
(Chan, 2011). In 1978, China implemented an open-door policy and negotiated 
with the British government to export fresh food to Hong Kong. Since then, 
Hong Kong has depended heavily on Chinese imports of fresh vegetables, fish, 
and pork. This led to a dramatic decline in local food production. Recently, the 
desire to consume local products has increased because the public is 
concerned about food safety issues in China, ranging from milk powder 
contaminated with melamine, to recycled oil, and toxic chemical usage in the 
food production system. The rise and decline of agricultural activities in Hong 
Kong provides an opportunity to evaluate the conflicts over urban agriculture 
in specific time and space. There is a paucity of studies to examine why a 
higher value is assigned to certain forms of urban agriculture over others.1 For 
instance, urban vegetable farming presents a more positive aesthetic image; 
urban pig farming differs from other types of agriculture because of associated 
sanitary risks, the need for manure management, and odor issues. This study 
employs a political ecology perspective informed by animal geographies to 
examine how the meat politics in the License-Buy-Back Scheme (LBBS) has 
become a tactic to reduce and control the pig farming industry in Hong Kong.  
In order to eradicate the transmission of pig-to-human diseases and sanitary 
risks, governing institutions introduced the LBBS to discipline and regulate 
pig farming practices in 2006. A new system of sanitary norms and normative 
behaviors were produced to regulate farm spaces and farmers. The 
articulations of farm management, record system, standardization, and 
animal waste treatment knowledge became the tactics to transform pig farm 
spaces and produce normative sanitary pig farming behaviours. The LBBS was 
portrayed in a government document as a program voluntarily adopted by pig 
farmers. This chapter argues that the sanitary discourse created a cloak to 
disguise the intervention of the governing institutions and produced a 
marginalized pig-raising environment to force farmers to relinquish their 
licenses. The concept of voluntarily surrendering pig farmers’ licenses should 
be critically revisited.  
To understand better the politics of the LBBS, an archival investigation was 
conducted during 2009–2012 to understand the social and biophysical factors 
which tend to restrict the pig farming industry. To engage with pig farmers in 
this research, the author interviewed 19 pig farmers (out of 43 operating pig 
farms) to understand their perceptions on the LBBS, and conducted 
ethnographical studies of two pig farms to triangulate archival documents 
with farmers’ daily practices (Shrum, 2004). This chapter begins by 
introducing the concept of political ecology and discusses the rationale for the 
governing institutions to implement the LBBS. Then the paper turns to 
illustrate the disciplinary techniques and political tactics in LBBS, 
highlighting how different stakeholders perceive these techniques. Finally, 
this chapter concludes by highlighting how the sanitary discourse constructs 
the pig farming industry as problematic and naturalizes the intervention of 
the governing institutions. 
Political ecology and animal studies 
Political ecology brings politics into consideration to understand society and 
environment interactions. According to Blaikie and Brookfield (1987, p17), 
political ecology concerns both ecology and political economy. The term 
‘political ecology’ was first coined by anthropologist Eric Wolf in a research 
article titled Ownership and Political Ecology (Watts, 2003). Piers Blaikie’s 
oeuvre further contributed to this field in three major ways. It:  
1 integrated political economy perspectives in environmental science 
(Robbins and Bishop, 2008); 
2 bridged the structuralist and post-structuralist debates with material 
ecologies, reflexivity, and network synthesis (Grove, 2009); and  
3 adopted a multidisciplinary approach to address local knowledge and 
practical alternatives to the developmental issues (Simon, 2008). 
Paulson et al. (2003) and Robbins (2004) provide succinct reviews of the 
intellectual genealogies of political ecology. The mid-twentieth century 
scholars, theorizing on political ecology, diverged from environmental and 
cultural determinism, which claimed that climatic factors influenced 
civilizations. The determinists’ approach naturalized the domination of the 
powerful group and justified the process of colonization. By assuming 
inevitability, the practice of colonialism comes to appear apolitical (Robbins, 
2004, p19). Combining political economy approaches with ecological studies 
opened up opportunities for research on opaque actors such as farmers and 
yielded more research on colonial and post-colonial systems, power and 
discourses, environmental justice, global and regional governance as well as 
the marginal groups in developing countries (Byrant and Bailey, 1997; 
Fairhead and Leach, 1995; Robbins and Sharp, 2003; Scott 1985; 
Swyngedouw, 2008). Concerning the themes of political ecology from 
geographical perspectives, Zimmerer and Bassett (2003) elucidate the 
understanding of social-environment interactions and production of scale. Yet, 
Bryant and Bailey (1997, p30) argue that the goals of political ecology in 
geography are to examine ‘marginality, vulnerability, and risk’ of the 
marginalized groups in everyday and episodic bases.  
Recent debates on political ecology emphasize four major aspects:  
1 the social construction of scale and reproduction of scale from below 
(Bulkeley, 2005; Nelsen and Simonsen, 2003); 
2 the call to combine both structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives in 
order to examine the biophysical and bio-economical changes in rural-
urban, industrial, and global north and south settings (Swyngedouw and 
Heynen, 2003; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003);  
3 the discussion of gender and the household’s power relationships in 
multiple scales (Paulson and Gezon, 2004); and  
4 the engagement of traditional sciences, material ecologies, and complexity 
theories to look for practical solutions and ponder alternatives (Rocheleau, 
2008).  
The scope of political ecology not only addresses different levels of politics on 
vulnerable biophysical environment but also engages with science and social 
science to ponder alternatives to development paths for vulnerable groups. 
However, few political ecology studies address why certain forms of 
agriculture are viewed more positively than others. Particularly, why is pig 
farming less desirable than other types of urban agriculture?  
Integrating animal geographies with the political ecology literature helps to 
answer the above questions two major ways: (1) it examines how ‘the animal 
problematizes the power relationship’ between governing institutions and 
farmers (Neo 2012, p951); and (2) it questions human-pig relationships and 
use of spatial tactics to control animal-human transmitted diseases (Emel and 
Urbanik, 20l0; Enticott, 2008). Animal studies provide insightful angles to 
understand how humans perceive pigs in different spatial and temporal 
settings. Serpell (2004) argues that affection and utility determined human’s 
perceptions toward pigs. Holloway and Morris (2013) explain that aesthetic 
evaluations and judgments transform human perceptions on pigs. For 
instance, humans evaluate pig odors and wastes as social nuisances (Vukina et 
al., 1996). In fact, images of pigs are constructed discursively to inform 
societal norms of urbanity, determining whether pigs are in place or out of 
place in the city (Creswell, 1996). For example, Cronon (1992, p228) depicts 
how the city of Cincinnati in the nineteenth century constructed itself as the 
‘Porkopolis’ because millions of pigs provided huge economic value. However, 
the Smithfield Meat Market in London was vilified because urban imagination 
of pigs in the city of London evolved to consider them unsanitary and filthy, 
leading to their removal in 1852 (Dodd, 1856). To illustrate how the 
perceptions of pigs changed over time and space, Stibbe (2003) examines the 
use of the word ‘pig’ in the British National Corpus and points out that 
presuppositions concerning pigs became constructed negatively, especially, 
during the outbreaks of animal-human transmitted diseases such as H1N1, 
foot and mouth disease, and avian flu (Convery et al., 2005; Davis, 2006; 
Perdue and Swayne, 2005). Pigs were perceived as the hosts of pathogens, 
which led governing institutions to develop a set of practices to increase 
biosecurity measures (Donaldson, 2008; Law and Miele, 2011). The above 
studies provide insightful direction to consider how the pig farming industry 
can become less desirable than other types of urban agriculture under the gaze 
of the stakeholders and governing institutions. 
The context of the meat politics in the LBBS (2006–2007) 
The rationale for implementing the License-Buy-Back Scheme (LBBS) was to 
reduce the ‘risk of avian influenza outbreaks’ because with ‘rapid urbanization 
of the New Territories, pig farming has brought about public health and 
pollution concerns’ (LCFC, 2006 p2). Pigs became a host for spreading the 
pathogenic H5N1, H1N1, Japanese encephalitis, and Streptococcus suis 
(Auewarakul, 2004; Menon, 2011). Both human and nonhuman actors, who 
came into contact with pigs, became possible carriers of these pathogens. This 
sanitary consideration drove governing institutions to control the whole pig 
farming industry in Hong Kong including pig farmers, workers, retailers, and 
live pig transporters.  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, biosecurity became a major concern of 
numerous countries (Smart and Smart, 2008). Different levels of politics and 
governance were shaping the production, distribution, and consumption of 
livestock products from global organizations (e.g. the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to local government departments (e.g., the 
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department, the Health Department, and 
the Center for Health Protection Services). Hong Kong’s economy was hit hard 
by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003; the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of Hong Kong decreased by 3.7 percent in one quarter and the 
government reminded the public to ‘never forget the painful lesson from SARS’ 
(41st Livestock Subcommittee Meeting, 2005, p6). To control the spread of 
pig-to-human diseases at the local level, governing institutions produced new 
norms of sanitary practices on the territory, street, farm, and personal levels.2 
The need for biosecurity reproduced the production relationships among 
governing institutions such as the Agricultural, Fisheries and Conservation 
Department (AFCD), Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD), 
Legislative Council Financial Committee (LCFC) and pig farmers. Pig-to-
human disease transmission became a problem for governing institutions, 
which had to consider the whole live pig industry (pig farmers, workers, 
retailers, and live pig transporters) in their political agendas. The prima facie 
reasons of the governing institutions for buying back the whole industry’s 
licenses were:  
1 pig-raising was perceived high sanitary and public health risks (AFCD 
Livestock Subcommittee, 2005); 
2 pig farms became identified as mosquito breeding grounds (LCFC, 2006); 
and 
3 reducing pig-human contact was deemed essential (FAO and WOAH, 
2005).  
In 2005, the governing institutions aimed to eradicate the whole industry by 
providing nine million Hong Kong dollars to attract operators, retailers, 
wholesalers, and transporters to return their licenses to the government. As a 
result, 222 out of 265 pig farmers gave up their licenses and ceased their 
operations. This study argues that the LBBS was depoliticized and neutralized 
by rhetorically emphasizing the pig farmers’ willingness. The Legislative 
Council Finance Committee documented a debatable statement, that: 
the proposal to buy back pig farming licenses was first raised by 
local pig farmers … [the] Health, Welfare and Food Bureau 
received over 190 written submissions, representing nearly half of 
all pig farms, urging the early launch of the voluntary surrender 
scheme. [Emphasis added.] 
(LCFC, 2006, p9)  
By arguing that pig farming created potential threats and risks to Hong Kong, 
the governing institutions could technically claim a neutral position by 
disguising the underlying political agenda as a conflict between the general 
public and pig farmers. The sanitary argument was highlighted when it was 
discovered that pigs were a host for the SARS virus. According to a survey 
undertaken by the Legislative Council, the public weighed health and safety 
concerns over the livelihoods of farmers and livestock, and the pig farming 
industry itself. The survey was anthropocentric3 and did not consider animal 
ethics or human-pig relationships. Launching the LBBS was purportedly to 
reduce pig-to-human transmitted disease; however, the underlying reason to 
implement the LBBS was to lessen the political risk and reduce sanitary risks 
that hampered tertiary industry growth. For instance, the mishandling of 
SARS patients, the unnecessary delay of warnings, and bureaucratic inertia 
created extensive social discontent. On July 1, 2003, 500,000 Hong Kong 
citizens demonstrated to express their frustrations and distrust toward the 
government’s enactment of security bills, mismanagement of the SARS crisis, 
and economic depression. Finally, the chief executive Tung Chee-Hwa was 
forced to resign. This political lesson illustrated that public health crises 
played a role in triggering political crises.  
In addition, the conclusion of the report titled Ex-Gratia Payments to Pig 
Farmers highlighted the ‘urgency’ of buying back pig farmers’ licenses so that 
the purchases could be made ‘before the high risk summer season of Japanese 
encephalitis (JE) outbreak’ (LCFC, 2006, p9). Two major reasons were given: 
(1) pig farms accumulate stagnant water and produce a breeding ground for 
mosquitoes; (2) the pig is one of the transmission hosts of JE. However, the 
Finance Committee rhetorically exaggerated the severity of JE although there 
were no supporting data to show the number of reported cases of infections 
from pig farmers, workers, retailers, and live pig transporters. Interestingly, 
the Hong Kong Medical Journal noted that the reported cases of JE in Hong 
Kong from 1967 to 2004 were sporadic. According to this report, ‘Hong Kong 
sees only a few sporadic cases of JE, thus it is unwise and perhaps not 
necessary to advocate a universal vaccination programme’ (Lam et al. 2005, 
p186). Furthermore, between 1967 and 2003, of the 45 cases of JE reported 
(including local and imported cases) only two cases were reported by the 
residents within 2.6 km of the abattoirs and pig farms, and ‘in the remaining 
cases neither abattoirs nor pigsties existed nearby’ (ibid., p185). The report 
makes four important points: 
1 pigsties were not necessarily the breeding ground of JE; 
2 according to the report, there was no reported case about the infections 
from pig farmers and live pork retailers and wholesalers (ibid.); 
3 the medical doctors didn’t argue that infected cases were directly related to 
pig farms or abattoirs areas. Their findings did not absolutely accuse pig 
farms as the breeding grounds of JE; 
4 apart from pigs, domestic or wild animals were also a potential host of JE 
(ibid.).  
Additionally, the medical doctors in this paper suggested providing a 
vaccination of the pigs as an effective way to solve the problem.  
The pig farming industry in Hong Kong has been shrinking over the 
last few years, so vaccination of a small and diminishing pig 
population may be the most efficacious, sustainable, and cost-
effective measure to prevent the spread of JE (ibid., p186).  
Based on the mentioned arguments, JE became an imaginary enemy for the 
governing institutions. The government produced different sanitary 
monitoring schemes to discipline pig farmers, to depoliticize the License-Buy-
Back Scheme and to mystify how the governing institution made a very tough 
environment for pig farmers to survive.  
The LBBS (2006–2007) 
In 2005, the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s Finance Committee accepted 
the ex-gratia payment through the License-Buy-Back Scheme (LBBS) to buy 
back the pig farmers, retailers, and transport workers’ licenses to operate. 
According to the Legislative Council Finance Committee (LCFC), there were 
three major reasons to buy back the whole industry licenses.  
First, pig farming caused a serious pollution problem. The justification of the 
Finance Committee’s actions was linked to the quantity of the pig excrement: 
in 2006, there were 265 farms raising about 330,000 pigs which generated 
520 metric tons of excrement each day (LCFC, 2006, p2). But, if pig farmers 
participated in the Livestock Waste Control Scheme (1987–1997), they had to 
install pig waste treatment facilities and treat pig waste prior to discharging it 
into rivers. The amount of pig excrement was only a number used by the 
governing institutions to illustrate the impacts of pig waste. If the governing 
institutions wanted to accuse pig farmers of indiscriminately discharging pig 
waste, they should have provided the number of prosecutions and amount of 
indiscriminately discharged pig waste instead of merely relating that ‘330,000 
pigs generated 520 metric tons of excrement each day’ (ibid.). This statement 
accentuated the a priori linkages between number of pigs and direct impacts 
of excrement but ignored the fact that the majority of pig farmers had 
properly treated the pig waste. 
Second, pig raising was argued to be unsuitable for Hong Kong because it 
caused public health problems. 
With the rapid urbanization of Hong Kong, particularly in the New 
Territories (N.T.), sustainable pig farming in Hong Kong is no 
longer a realistic long-term policy option in view of the public 
health and pollution problems arising from it. The Administration 
should therefore freeze the number of pig farms, by stopping the 
issue of new pig farm licenses and freezing the current rearing 
capacity to restrict the number of pigs in Hong Kong.  
(LCFC, 2006, p2)  
Owing to the urbanization process in the New Territories (NT), pig farming 
became a sanitary and pollution problem. To reduce the risk to public health, 
the governing institutions decided to restrict the number of pig farms, stop 
issuing new pig farm licenses, and freeze the pig raising capacity as a means to 
control the pig farming industry.  
Third, the urgency to eradicate the hosts of Japanese encephalitis and 
Streptococcus suis was cited as a reason to buy back licenses. These diseases 
create serious threats for the people in Hong Kong. An Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Conservation Department veterinarian said that the reason to implement 
the LBBS was to remove the health risk posed by pigs, which are hosts for the 
pathogen Streptococcus suis because it can cause serious illnesses. The 
bacterium can enter the human body through skin wounds. In order to 
prevent infection, people should avoid contact with pigs (48th Livestock 
Subcommittee minutes, 2007). As aforementioned, Japanese encephalitis can 
be spread through pigs; eradicating pig-related businesses became a major 
tool for controlling the spread of Japanese Encephalitis and Streptococcus 
suis in Hong Kong. 
The above reasons provide opportunities and justifications for the governing 
institutions to buy back the whole industry’s licenses and tighten the pig farms’ 
regulations. Those human and non-human actors4 who interact with pigs 
came to be regarded as problematic as well. The ‘curse’ of pigs is diffused from 
their problematic body to pig farms, live pig handling vehicles, and abattoirs. 
Pig farm workers, live pig retailers, and transporters became problematic 
bodies themselves as their bodies assist virus transmission. Under the gaze of 
the governing institutions, the pig farming network had become a series of 
problematic spaces and moving bodies. These problematic spaces were 
targeted for eradication through the two major governing technologies by: (1) 
using ex-gratia payments to buy back the industry’s licenses and (2) proposing 
the Codes of Practices to further regulate the pig farming spaces.  
Ex-gratia payment5 
In 2004, the Health, Welfare and Food Bureau in Hong Kong proposed the 
ex-gratia payment for live pig farmers, workers, retailers, and transporters. 
Meanwhile, the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department proposed 
the new Codes of Practices for the pig farmers. In fact, these two new policies 
are complementary: either an ex-gratia payment or stringent control is 
appropriate for pig farmers. The Health, Welfare and Food Bureau drafted a 
proposal:  
The Government should tighten up the existing livestock licensing 
regulatory regime by ensuring strict compliance with the licensing 
conditions. Under the circumstances, it is considered appropriate 
that a voluntary surrender scheme for pig farmers should be 
introduced for those who do not wish to continue to operate under 
an increasingly stringent regulatory regime. [Emphasis added.] 
(LCFC, 2006, p3)  
From the above statement, the meaning of ‘voluntary surrender’ was 
contradictory. First, the governing institutions only provided two choices and 
did not consult6 with the pig farming industry beforehand. Second, the 
governing institutions increased stringent controls on pig farming, creating 
lots of stress, fear, and unsettling feelings among farmers (Tao, 2008). Pig 
farmers were involuntarily presented with a turbulent business environment; 
the only realistic option was to give up their licenses in return for financial 
compensation. Finally, it caused 222 pig farmers to give up their licenses and 
only 43 farms still continue pig farming (See table 17.1). 
Table 17.1 Change in the Pig Farming Industry after 2006 LBBS 
Indicator 2006 - 2007 2007 -2008 
Pig farms 265 43 
Number of licenses bought back 171 
 
222  
(accumulative total) 
 
Number of local live pigs 426,000 75,000 
  Source: The data is summarized from the Agriculture Fisheries, and 
Conservation Department (AFCD), Livestock Subcommittee minutes (48th 
AFCD Livestock Subcommittee Meeting, September 2007; 49th meeting, 
January 2008; minutes, 50th meeting, February 2008). 
To reduce the chance of human-pig contact, the governing institutions not 
only removed pig farm space, but also reduced the number of live pig workers, 
retailers, and transporters. The governing institutions aimed at providing ex-
gratia payments for 800 workers and offered loans to 130 live pig transporters 
to convert their vehicles into frozen meat carriers.  
To assist those local workers of the live pig farming/transport 
industry who become unemployed as a result of their employers 
ceasing operation under the proposed voluntary surrender scheme, 
we propose to provide a one-off grant of $18,000 to each worker … 
the livelihood of the live pig transporters whose sole business is to 
transport live pigs from local farms to slaughterhouses … to assist 
these live pig transporters, we propose to provide an unsecured 
loan of up to $50,000 per vehicle for them to upgrade/convert their 
vehicles for conveying chilled/frozen products or for other business 
operations. 
(LCFC, 2006, p3)  
The fates of local workers and live pig transporters were similar to pig farmers, 
since they were a derivative industry dependent on live pig supply from local 
pig farms. Buying back pig farmers’ licenses affected the jobs of local workers 
and live pig transporters because the live pig businesses were shrinking. Local 
workers and live pig transporters might become unemployed or have to 
convert to other business operations. Surrendering their live pig handling 
rights and accepting ex-gratia payments were the plausible options for them. 
Codes of practices – spatial controls on remaining 43 pig farms 
In 2007, the AFCD announced the Codes of Practices in order to further 
monitor and regulate the remaining 43 pig farms. The experts from the Centre 
for Health Protection (CHP), Department of Health, in Hong Kong worried 
that these pig farms created health risks because of their proximity to ‘human 
habitation’ (Alberta Government – H.K. office, 2007). In 2007, the Food and 
Health Bureau, Environment Bureau (FHBEB) and Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Conservation Department (AFCD) proposed 43 odes to local pig farmers. The 
Codes of Practices was designed to remove Japanese encephalitis, increase 
farm efficiency, and improve the quality of live pig supply in Hong Kong. Here 
is the quote from the Legislative Council: 
The emergence of Japanese encephalitis in recent years which is 
endemic among pigs, has also drawn public attention to the 
management and hygiene of local pig farms …The Code of Practice 
(COP) aims at enhancing management efficiency of pig farms and 
reducing the risk of disease outbreaks, so as to ensure a more stable 
supply of fresh pork with better quality assurance. The health of 
farm workers and people on farm can also be better safeguarded. 
(Legislative Council 2008b, p1) 
The governing institutions aimed to produce new rules and regulations to 
imbue pig farmers with new standards and practices as a means to reduce 
public health risks. These 43 rules were proposed to be incorporated into the 
Livestock Keeping License. These rules monitor five major pig-raising 
practices, including husbandry and farm management; movement control; 
disease monitoring and control; and waste management and hygiene. The 
marking scheme7 identifies 43 prohibited pig-farming practices; they are 
grouped under categories 1, 2, 3. Category 1 includes minor misdeeds causing 
minor sanitary and hygienic threats. Items in category 2 are more serious and 
cause medium threats, while category 3 includes serious threats, which will 
cause the Director of AFCD to revoke a pig farmer’s license immediately. In 
fact, the Codes of Practices impose more regulations and controls on pig 
farmers and imbue the new concept of sanitary management (See Table 17.2).  
 
 
 
Table 17.2 Proposed Codes of Practices to be imposed on pig farmers 
Descriptions	   	  Codes	  of	  Practices	   Governing	  institution’s	  explanations	  
(1)	  Spatial	  control	  and	  sanitary	  
management	  of	  pig	  farms	  
	  
Rule	  1	   There	  is	  clear	  delineation	  of	  boundary.	  The	  
licensee	  must	  declare	  the	  boundaries,	  
quarantine	  facilities,	  isolation	  facilities,	  
production	  areas	  and	  non-­‐production	  areas	  of	  
his/her	  farm	  on	  a	  map	  that	  precisely	  indicates	  
the	  geographic	  location	  of	  the	  farm	  structures	  
(AFCD	  LS	  1/08,	  Annex,	  2008,	  p1).	  
	  
(2)	  Construction	  of	  normative	  
pest	  control	  behavior	  in	  pig	  farm	  
space	  
	  
Rule	  7	  
	  
Licensee	  shall	  incorporate	  an	  active,	  effective	  
rodent,	  pest	  and	  mosquito	  control	  system	  
into	  management	  practice	  …	  eliminate	  all	  
accumulation	  of	  stagnant	  water	  in	  the	  farm,	  
trim	  the	  vegetation,	  and	  clear	  the	  surface	  
channels	  and	  sand	  traps	  especially	  during	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  year	  when	  there	  is	  aggregation	  of	  
migratory	  birds.	  The	  updated	  operation	  
protocol	  for	  the	  aforesaid	  system	  shall	  be	  
submitted	  to	  this	  Department	  (AFCD	  LS	  1/08,	  
Annex,	  2008,	  p1).	  
	  
(3)	  Normative	  waste	  treatment	  
and	  hygiene	  practices	  in	  pig	  farm	  
space	  
	  
Rule	  39	   No	  discharge	  of	  liquid	  livestock	  waste	  shall	  
bypass	  the	  waste	  treatment	  system,	  the	  
Sampling	  Point	  or	  the	  Discharge	  Point	  unless	  
it	  is	  unavoidable	  to	  prevent	  loss	  of	  life,	  
personal	  injury	  or	  severe	  property	  damage	  or	  
no	  feasible	  alternative	  exist.	  Any	  pipe	  works	  
that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  bypass	  discharge	  of	  
liquid	  livestock	  waste,	  no	  matter	  permanently	  
installed	  or	  temporarily	  connected,	  are	  
prohibited	  (AFCD	  LS	  1/08,	  Annex,	  2008,	  p7).	  
Source: The Agricultural, Fisheries, and Conservation Department (2008). 
The Codes of Practices - File No: LS 1/08 Annex: 1–16. 
Rule 1 required pig farmers to draw out the production and non-production 
boundaries on their farms. Within each bounded area, there are different sets 
of values, norms, and orders appropriate for the normative farming practices. 
For instance, the visibilities of the painted lines between the production and 
non-production zones remind farmers that they have different practices in 
handling pig and waste treatment. The new spatial order enhances separation 
and control of pigs because boundaries delineate appropriate behaviors and 
confine normative practices. Boundary delineation, knowledge of hygiene, 
farm management, and biosecurity are articulated in the new spatial order.  
Rule 7 is a self-regulating rule, which monitors farmers’ work. Farmers must 
supervise themselves in the removal of rodents, pests, and mosquitoes that 
can become the host to spread diseases. Since the pig is seen as the host of 
Japanese encephalitis, regulating farmers to remove static standing water and 
cut down weeds are the ways to reduce the threats of Japanese encephalitis. 
Farmer representatives commented that rarely ‘can pig farms eliminate 
rodents because the storage of fodder crops attracts them’ (The AFCD LS 1/08, 
Annex 2008, p1). If the governing institutions would like to reduce the rodent 
problems on pig farms, they should provide more financial and technological 
assistance to pig farmers.  
Rule 39 (including rules 31 and 33) requires the provision of precise waste 
treatment floor plans and waste treatment records. Precise waste treatment 
procedures are produced to promote standardized sanitization behavior, self-
regulation, and surveillance. This facilitates the monitoring agencies’ waste 
sampling and the farmers’ adherence to norms. Regarding farmers’ 
perceptions on this normative waste treatment practice, pig farmers strongly 
disagree with these rules for three major reasons:  
1 it is not necessary for farmers to resubmit another farm plan because the 
AFCD already has the farmers’ farm plans;  
2 it is nonsensical to put signs or notices to indicate the discharge outlets in a 
private farm space;  
3 it is difficult to remove obstacles such as grass nearby the discharge outlets 
(47th Livestock Subcommittee, 2007, p3). 
Pig farmers who break rule 39 will have their licenses revoked by the AFCD 
directors if they are found to be directly discharging animal wastes into the 
river, due to the high risk to public health. This is a direct command to inform 
farmers that they must follow the uniform rules and regulations. This 
command develops a new conception of order to confine waste management 
in designated farm premises with appropriate hygenic norms. Pig farmers 
fiercely object for two major reasons: (1) current environmental ordinances 
provide adequate legal power for the monitoring agencies to penalize 
offending farmers; farmers argue that the ulterior intention of this rule is to 
force pig farmers to surrender their licenses; (2) pig farmers argue that 
revoking their licenses is directly meant to estrange their businesses and 
create entensive economic hardship to their entire family. In this situation, 
farmers would choose prison confinement over revocation of their licenses 
(Livestock Subcommittee 50th meeting 2008, pp2–3).  
In short, the Codes of Practices imbue the new knowledge of precision, 
sanitarization, farm management, biosecurity monitoring, and survelliance of 
farmers’ waste treatment practices. New spatial order and normative practices 
are produced through boundary delination and animal quarantine. A system 
of hygenic and santiary rules transform pig farming space into a hygenic and 
sanitary space. In this new spatial order, farmers are expected to have 
appropriate waste treatment behaviors and normative sanitary practices. The 
author argues that the Code of Practices will further strangle the pig farming 
industry and force farmers to give up their licenses. 
Perceptions of crucial players in the Hong Kong pig farming 
industry 
In the following section, the perceptions of the Deputy Dirctor and 
veterinarians of the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, 
legislative council members, and the general public of the License-Buy-Back 
Scheme will be presented.  
The perceptions of deputy director and veterinarians of the 
AFCD 
The AFCD perceived the License Buy Back Scheme as an ‘emergency exit for 
pig farmers’ because there is no possibility for long-term development of pig 
farming in Hong Kong and the control will be tightened and strengthened 
(author’s translation from the representative of the AFCD in the 52th 
Livestock Subcommittee, 2008). The attitudes of the AFCD on Hong Kong pig 
farming are pessimistic and negative for four reasons:  
1 pig farming causes serious sanitary and pollution problems especially 
regarding the threats of pig-to-human disease transmissions;  
2 the urbanization process increases the proximity of human habitation and 
pig farms, which presents a public health risk;  
3 the impossibility of relocating all livestock and pig farming to one special 
farming zone involves adding a huge financial cost of buying land; and  
4 Hong Kong doesn’t have sufficient land for long-term development of the 
pig farming industry. 
The perceptions of the Legislative Council members 
In the Legislative Council discussions of the ex-gratia payment and codes of 
practices for the pig farming industry, most of the legislative council members 
supported the LBBS and the Codes of Practices for five reasons:  
1 reducing public health and environmental problems (e.g. the 520 metric 
tons of pig excrement);  
2 the provision of the ex-gratia payment is a way to help pig farmers and 
their workers change to other occupations;  
3 pig farmers can operate their businesses in Mainland China, for example, 
by relocating pig farms into the Guandong Province as it is close to Hong 
Kong;  
4 Hong Kong cannot provide enough land for the long term development of 
the pig-farming industry;  
5 the only contribution of the pig-farming industry is to stabilize food 
production and provide fresh meat (Legislative Finance Council Committee, 
2008a; 2008b).  
The view of the general public 
The views of the general public toward the pig farming industry are 
speculative and fluctuate with the occurrence of the animal-human 
transmission diseases. For instance, the Prevention of H5N1: Reduction of the 
Risk of Human Infection of H5N1 Survey (Prevention of H5N1 Survey in short) 
was conducted by the governing insistutions in 2005 suggested that the 
general public was worried about H5N1 effects on the health of citizens and 
the economy in Hong Kong. The survey also suggested that public safety and 
health is the first priority of citizens. However, another survey, Opinion 
Survey on the Incident of the H5N1 Bird Flu (Opinion Survey in short), which 
was conducted by the University of Hong Kong in 1999 had different 
interpretations. This survey suggested that the ‘perception of the citizens 
toward H5N1 threats is inflated,’ reflecting temporary fears of H5N1 and even 
‘90 percent of the interviewees said they were not worried that they might be 
infected with the H5N1’ (Opinion Survey, 1998, pp14–15). When comparing 
the Opinion Survey with the governing institutions’ survey – Prevention 
Survey of H5N1 – these two surveys presented two different outcomes. These 
results show that public opinion of the livestock industry is dependent on the 
number of animal-human transmission cases at any point in time. Fear and 
distrust over the local pig farming industry becomes exaggerated whenever 
there is a disease outbreak. According to the South China Morning Post 
(2003), the mass media amplifies the threats of the pig diseases by grossly 
exaggerating a general disease such as foot and mouth disease into epidemic 
level. There is no doubt that the general public is concerned about how H5N1 
poses threats to livelihoods because of the reports of the mass media and the 
discourses constructed by the governing institutions. 
The perception of the Federation of Pig Raising Co-operative 
Societies 
The Federation of Pig Raising Co-operative Societies (TFPRSC) in Hong Kong 
opposed the new regulations on the pig farming industry because it is 
skeptical that the government wants to restore its credibility, retain goodwill 
from the general public, and fairly regulate the pig farming industry. Pig 
farmers commented in letters published in the FPRCS’s magazine: 
The government portrays a negative image of the pig farming 
industry by accusing the pig farming industry of causing the 
outbreaks of H5N1 and Japanese Encephalitis. This is a tactic for 
the government officals to restore their credibility from the general 
public by strengthening the controls of live pig production, retailing, 
and logistics. We are treading on thin ice because farmers can 
easily violate the Waste Disposal Ordinance, Public Health Safety 
Ordinance etc. Once farmers violate these ordinances three times 
within 18 months, their licenses will be revoked and their whole 
family will be put in jeopardy. The government mobilized 
numerous resources, like recruiting many officers to monitor pig 
farmers and devising lots of regulations to discipline farmers to 
follow the new rules. The underlying intentions are to strangle the 
whole industry and create a process of attrition. Then pig farmers 
will unintentionally perish in smoke and ashes. The government is 
happy to see this scenario because pig farms then will not hamper 
the economic development. 
(Author’s translation, TFPRSC, 2001 pp51–53). 
Pig farmers’ perceptions 
In order to understand farmers’ perspectives on LBBS, 21 in-depth interviews 
were conducted with pig farmers from September 2010 to October 2010. Pig 
farmers expressed their difficulties and opinions of the future development of 
the pig farming industry and new proposed Codes of Practices.  
Mr Chan8 commented that the Codes of Practices 
are impossible to follow because the rules are too strict for us. In 
fact, farmers already had an agreement in place with the 
government in the Livestock Waste Control Scheme since the 1980s. 
Without a doubt pig farmers had installed waste treatment facilities 
and treated animal wastes prior to any discharge. There is no 
reason to accuse us of being the major polluters of Hong Kong.  
Mr. Leung9 commented the consultations organized by the AFCD ‘are just a 
window-dressing to legitimize the number of farmers who participate in the 
consultations. The AFCD officals always promise farmers verbally; however, 
the suggestions from farmers are yet to materialize.’ 
Mr. Yuen10 argues that  
almost every government department visits my farm. I don’t know 
why the Housing Department also came to my farm. You know that 
the visits of government officials create pressure and psychological 
anxiety for me. Not only do I face the internal farm issues and 
hectic pig farming routines, but I face the frequent visits from the 
government officials. Why can’t they allow me to raise my pigs 
peacefully?  
From the above comments, one can see that pig farmers were worried about 
the proposed Codes of Practices, and the tightening controls on the pig raising 
industry. In fact, the AFCD is also responsible for the sanitary problems and 
the marginality of the pig farming industry. Reviewing AFCD’s policies, free 
vaccinations and veterinary services were provided for pig farmers from the 
1960s to the mid-1980s. However, the AFCD stopped providing free 
vaccination services in the late 1980s. At the 47th AFCD Livestock 
Subcommittee meeting, pig farmers had a debate with the government’s 
veterinarians over the issue of veterinary service provision. A pig farmer 
representative argued that local pig farmers are unable to hire a veterinarian 
and ‘this caused pig farmers to test different drugs on pig bodies and find out 
the right remedies for pigs’ (47th AFCD Livestock Subcommittee 2007, p3). 
Inappropriate veterinary drug practice not only reduces pigs’ resistance to 
diseases, but it also reduces the effectiveness of drugs. Facing this situation, a 
government veterinarian replied that the AFCD only provides ‘verbal opinions 
on veterinary drugs usages, quarantine, and sterilization methods’ (ibid.) 
because ‘the suggestion of drug usage involves commercial considerations’ 
(ibid.), which are not suitable for a veterinarian to be involved in. This 
veterinarian suggested the farmers’ representative set up a drug record system 
and write down their animal drug usage experiences on their own. Facing the 
lack of veterinary services and support in Hong Kong, farmers should figure 
out different self-help tactics in order to sustain their businesses. The AFCD 
emphasised the control and monitoring of the pig farming industry but was 
unwilling to train husbandry veterinarians to help pig farmers combat pig 
diseases. Therefore, the governing institutions restricted veterinary services 
and produced a self-help mentality among pig farmers, which becomes a tactic 
to marginalize the pig farming industry. Even worse, the LBBS in 2006–2007 
did not offer any capital grants to help pig farmers upgrade their waste 
treatment and sanitary management facilities. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
marginality of the pig farming industry drives pig farmers to give up their 
licenses. on the other hand, receiving the ex-gratia payment becomes the 
alternative for the pig farmers. Faced with the increasing precariousness of 
their marginalized situation, pig farmers reluctantly chose to give up their 
businesses in return for the ex-gratia payment. As a result, more than 222 pig 
farmers gave up their licenses in 2007. 
Conclusion 
To reduce the transmission of pig-to-human diseases and sanitary risks, the 
LBBS was launched to buy back the whole industry’s licenses and the new 
Codes of Practices were proposed to standardize spatial configurations to 
change farmers’ sanitary and pest control practices in pig farms. In the LBBS, 
the governing institutions problematized and constructed pigs as the hosts of 
contagious pig-to-human diseases. The sanitary discourse not only produced 
an uncertain pig-raising environment to coerce farmers to return their 
licenses but also highlighted the environmental conflicts (e.g. odor, risks of 
disease transmission, and pollution) between the pig farming industry and the 
general public. These conflicts produce political opportunities for the 
governing institutions to regulate the sanitary and environmental problems of 
the pig farming industry and to justify the LBBS. This research exposes the 
defects in a dominant sanitary discourse that favored governing institutions in 
their efforts to reduce political risks in the domain of public health. The 
function of the sanitary discourse naturalized the active role of governing 
institutions to further regulate farm spaces through the proposed new Codes 
of Practices; farmers are imbued with the concepts of farm management, 
sanitation, and standardized spatial configuration. Additionally, the pig 
farming industry was further constructed as undesirable and problematic 
because of the perceived filth (e.g. manure management), sanitary concerns 
(e.g. sewage discharge) and the flows of problematic bodies of pig farmers, live 
pig handlers and transporters who assist virus transmission (e.g. Japanese 
encephalitis). In light of these developments, the majority of pig farmers (222 
farmers) chose to give up their business in return for the ex-gratia payment. 
After the LBBS in 2008, there are only 43 pig farms still operating in Hong 
Kong. Through the lens of political ecology, this study critically rethinks the 
phenomenon of ‘voluntary surrender’ of pig farmers’ licenses and shows how 
the image of the voluntary is prejudicially constructed by governing 
institutions. Pig farmers were simultaneously dangled with the carrot of ex-
gratia payments to give up pig farming or hit with the stick of stricter 
regulations under the proposed Codes of Practices, the latter of which may 
ultimately lead to a revoke of their license without compensation. It is hence 
arguable whether pig farmers have indeed ‘volunteered’ to surrender their 
licenses. 
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Notes 
1  The author had a discussion with Prof. Alan Smart on 21st October 2013 
and he would like to acknowledge Prof. Smart’s suggestion to use the 
comparison between vegetable and pig farming as an example to illustrate 
the rise and fall of the H.K. agricultural activities. 
2 After the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
March 2003, the Chief Executive in Hong Kong established the Team Clean 
in May 2003 to formulate and implement policies in order to improve 
hygiene and provide environmental recommendations. For instance, the 
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department launched the Cleaning Hong 
Kong program to wash and clean up different streets in Hong Kong in 2001. 
Biosecurity measures and codes of practices were introduced to livestock 
and pig farming level in 2005 and 2007 respectively. The Public health 
monitoring network was activated on March 1, 2005 in order to provide an 
updated report of H5, H7 and H9 diseases. At the same time, the Center for 
Health Protection provided a leaflet to introduce hand-washing methods 
and other hygiene measures to the personal level. 
3 This survey concerned the public views on the government measures to 
reduce the outbreak of H5N1 diseases and considered how citizens 
perceived (1) the health of Hong Kong people, (2) the impact of H5N1 on 
Hong Kong’s economy, (3) the livelihoods of people engaged in live animal 
trade, (4) the culinary tradition of Hong Kong people and the reputation of 
Hong Kong as ‘gourmet paradise’ (Legislative Council, 2005, Paper No. CB 
(2) 566/04-05(03), p. 8–12.) 
4 Human actors who interact with pigs include pig farmers, retailers, and 
transport workers and non-human actors include materiality such as pig 
farming spaces, vehicles, and abattoirs.  
5 The ex-gratia payment is a financial compensation from the government to 
those farmers who would like to give up their licenses. 
6 The governing institutions explained that, owing to time constraints, they 
could not consult on the Scheme with farmers. In this sense, the choices 
were created by the governing institutions without farmers’ participation. 
7 The mentality behind the use of the marking scheme is borrowed from the 
‘Marking Scheme for Tenancy Enforcement in Public Housing Estates’ in 
2003. This marking scheme is to control 28 misdeeds which affect public 
estate’s cleanliness and hygiene conditions under Category A (3 points), B 
(5 points), C (7 points) and D (7 points). If tenant offences of public health 
issues reach 16 points within two years, the tenancy will be terminated.  
8 In-depth interview H.K. 001, Hong Kong, September, 2010. An in-depth 
interview was conducted with a pig farmer who is still engaged in pig 
farming in Hong Kong. To protect the interviewee’s privacy, I use Mr Chan 
as his pseudonym.  
9 In-depth interview H.K. 004, Hong Kong, September 2010. This in-depth 
interview is conducted with a former member of the AFCD’s Livestock 
Subcommittee. To protect the interviewee’s privacy, I use Mr Leung as his 
pseudonym. 
10 In-depth interview H.K. 007, Hong Kong, September 2010. This in-depth 
interview is conducted with a pig farmer. To protect the interviewee’s 
privacy, I use Mr Yuen as his pseudonym. 
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